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CORRECTIONS TO APPELLEES' STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellees incorrectly state that Beckman's original Complaint (filed on November
2, 2011) alleged "wrongful termination" (Appellees' Br. at p. 3). This is incorrect;
Beckman' s original complaint was for unpaid wages only (R. 1-5) and her employment
was not terminated until November 14, 2015. (See Pia. Trial Ex. 19). Appellees also state
(incorrectly) that in her Amended Complaint, she "sued" Franchise Foundry and Faulconer
for breaching the Employment Agreement. (Appellees' Br. at p. 3). The plain language of
the Amended Complaint does not support that assertion; Beckman' s claim against those
two Appellees was for declaratory relief only. (R. 17)
Appellees incorrectly state that Beckman was Cybertary's "sole officer" and
therefore, she was "ostensibly in charge of' whether she was paid. (Appellees' Br. at p. 4).
This is also false. As an LLC, Cybertary did not have "officers," and the Operating
Agreement appointed Beckman, Hicks, and Faulconer as managers ofCybertary. (See Pia.
I.@

Trial Ex. 2 at Article 6.1.2). 1
CORRECTIONS TO APPELLEES' STATEMENT OF FACTS

Appellees incorrectly (indeed, disingenuously) state that Beckman that did not
inform them of her bankruptcy filing. (Appellees' Br. at p. 6). In an email from Brad Smith
(counsel for Franchise Foundry) on September 15, 2011, Smith stated: "I want to
acknowledge that you did inform me that you would likely file bankruptcy" in April 2011.

On page 4 of their Brief, Defendants cite the special verdict fonn (R. 1501) as support for
the position that Beckman was "ostensibly in charge" of whether she was paid. Nothing in
the special verdict fonn supports that conclusion. Appellees repeat this false allegation on
page 14 of their brief.
1
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(See Pia. Tr. Ex. 12). Smith also confirmed, ''Fortunately, we have addressed all franchise
disclosure and registration issues regarding the bankruptcy." (Id.). Beckman also refers to
Defendants' Trial Exhibit 59, Beckman's email sent on on March 30, 3011, wherein she
quite clearly stated that she was in the process of filing for bankruptcy. Beckman further
refers to Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 10, where Faulconer himself acknowledged that
Beckman's bankruptcy was "inevitable." (See p. 3 of the Exhibit). Appellees' feigned
ignorance of the bankruptcy filing is especially deceitful considering Beckman worked
month after month without getting paid her wages. (See Pia. Tr. Ex. 33 and 34).
Appellees claim that Beckman "regularly accessed Cybertary's bank accounts for
her personal use." (Appelles' Br. at p. 14). In support of this claim, Appellees cite nothing
more than their own memorandum. (R. 1747). Of course, their memorandum (by itself)
does not prove or show that Beckman used Cybertary funds for her own personal use. The
bank statements themselves (Pia. Tr. Ex. 28) show that Mr. Faulconer was the primary
signatory on the account and that he regularly transferred funds to Franchise Foundry.
ARGUMENT

I.

The Employment Agreement specifically defines "cause" and the definition of
"just cause" from Uintah Basin has no applicability to this case.

Unlike the employment agreement in Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 2005 UT
App 92, 110 P.3d 168, the Employment Agreement in this case specifically defines what
amounts to "cause" for termination. (See Pia. Trial Ex. I at section 6(b)). Appellees
nevertheless argue that Uintah Basin's definition of'just cause" is controlling. (Appellees'
Br. at pp. 35-36). In essence, Appellees take the position that Uintah Basin's definition of

2
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4v

"just case" has been inserted into each and every employment contract in Utah where
termination must be supported by "cause". This result is nonsensical and nothing in the

Uintah Basin opinion remotely suggests that the Court intended the opinion to be applied
so broadly.
In Uintah Basin, after noting that the doctor's employment agreement did not define
'just cause", the Court stated:
"In sum, absent evidence that the parties intended a meaning of 'just cause' unique
to this particular agreement, we must conclude that the parties intended the term to
have its ordinary meaning." Uintah Basin, supra, at ,Il 7 (emphasis added).
In contrast, the Employment Agreement in this case includes specific and detailed
evidence that the parties intended a meaning of "cause" unique to their agreement. To state
the obvious, such evidence is the seven detailed circumstances listed in section 6(b) of the
Employment Agreement.
Yet another distinction to eviscerate any meaningful comparison to Uintah Basin is
that the agreement in Uintah Basin had no fixed term. Id. at ,I2. The Employment
Agreement in this case does (three years). (See section I of the Employment Agreement).
Appellees fail to identify ambiguity to depart from the four corners of the
Employment Agreement. 2 Instead of arguing that the agreement is ambiguous, Appellees
resort to a rhetorical question: "What conduct constitutes 'dereliction of ... duties,' or
¼i!J

'material misconduct', or 'conduct that discredits' Cybertary?" (Appellees' Br. at p. 36).

vJ

Beckman again notes that the Employment Agreement contains an integration clause in
section 12.
2

3
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The circumstances defining "cause" in the Employment Agreement are not as
nebulous as the Appellees claim. Rather than evaluate only the snippets of Section 6(b)
cited by the Appellees, Beckman asks this Court to read those snippets in the context of
the sentences in which they appear: 3
(ii)

"Executive's willful breach, habitual neglect, gross neglect, or dereliction of
Executive's duties under this Agreement;" (See Section 6(b) of the
Employment Agreement, Pia. Tr. Ex. I)

Ms. Beckman' s4 duties are quite clearly set forth in section 2 of the Employment
Agreement. "Dereliction"-when used as a noun-means "intentional abandonment."
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged, 1986). It does not take Uintah
Basin to interpret what ''dereliction" means.
(iii)

"Executive's material misconduct with regard to the Company, including,
but not limited to, Executive's failure to comply with Company's written
rules and policies;" (Id.)

Cybertary's written rules and policies are set forth in its own Operating Agreement.
(See Pia. Trial Ex. 2). Again, the agreement in Uintah Basin omitted any reference to
"material misconduct" and did not link such conduct to the employer's written policies.
(vi) "Any conduct, whether dishonest, fraudulent, or otherwise, that discredits the
Company or is detrimental to the reputation of the Company or the Company's
results of operations or business"; (See Section 6(b) of the Employment Agreement)

Although section 6(b) lists seven circumstances constituting "cause", Mr. Faulconer's
November 14, 2011 termination letter specifically cited only the above-references
subsections. (See Pia. Tr. Ex. 19).
3

4

Ms. Beckman is the "Executive" referred to in the Employment Agreement.
4
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The above subsection describes and de.fines what "conduct" will result in "cause"
for termination: if the conduct "discredits" Cybertary or is "detrimental" to its reputation,
then the conduct rises to the level of "cause" for termination. Those terms are not
ambiguous or scientific and do not require any guidance from Uintah Basin to interpret. In
fact, the District Court was required to interpret those terms under their plain and ordinary
meaning, but incorrectly failed to do so. See Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 629 (Utah
App.1993) (Clear and unambiguous contract tenns are interpreted "according to their plain
and ordinary meaning without resorting to extrinsic evidence.")
Appellees then argue that the "good faith business judgment" language from Uintah
Basin is "how Cybertary must prove" that "cause" existed. (Appellees' Br. at p. 38).

Beckman again emphasizes that the words "good faith business judgment" and "fair and
honest reason" do not appear anywhere in section 6 of the Employment Agreement. If all
Cybertary needed to terminate Beckman was good faith and honesty, then section 6 would
include that exceptionally low burden. It does not. Section 6 sets forth defined
circumstances amounting to "cause." If Cybertary wanted to be held to the standard of
"good faith business judgment" (in relation to Beckman's termination), it should have
~

included those terms in the Employment Agreement.
Cybertary did not have unfettered discretion and its judgment was not limited
merely by ''good faith." Cybertary's "discretion and judgment" were limited by section 6
of the Employment Agreement, and this Court should not allow Cybertary (and other
employers) to invoke Uintah Basin as a mechanism to rewrite employment contracts with
defined "cause" provisions.
5
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II.

The Employment Agreement permits only one "nonprevailing party" and
Cybertary was that party.

Appellees claim that the fees provision (section 16) in the Employment Agreement
fails to define "all amounts in dispute" and thus, the District Court was required to apply
its own meaning. (Id.) The phrase "all amounts in dispute" is plain and straightforward.
"'All amounts" (plural) means those amounts sought in the "dispute" (singular) in a "court
of competent jurisdiction." (See section 16 of the Employment Agreement).
Cybertary's frivolous disagreement regarding what "all amounts in dispute" means
is not enough to create ambiguity. See R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936
P .2d 1068, 107 4 (Utah 1997) (A contract tenn may be imprecise, but it is not ambiguous
if persons of competent skill and knowledge are capable of understanding its plain
meaning.). And even ifCybertary somehow identified plausible ambiguity, such ambiguity
would be resolved in Beckman's favor because Cybertary drafted the agreement. (R. 384).

See, e.g., Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, 748 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah Ct.App.1988)
(ambiguities should be construed against the drafter).
Appellees boldly proclaim that Beckman cannot "argue with a straight face" that
the total of "all amounts in dispute" was the difference between what Beckman sought
($235,041.05) and what Cybertary sought ($373,500) to arrive at -$138,458.95. (See
Appellee's Br. at p. 45). Combining what Beckman sought and what Cybertary sought
totals "all amounts in dispute" consistent with plain language of section 16. (Beckman
reiterates this argument with a "straight face.")

6
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~

Appellees urge this Court to adopt the bifurcation approach where each party's
claims are evaluated independently. (Appellees' Br. at p. 45). To the extent that warrants a
response, Beckman merely reiterates that Appellees' "bifurcation" approach is inconsistent
with the plain language of section 16. If section 16 contemplated "bifurcation," it would
~

refer to more than one "nonprevailing party". It does not. Section 16 states "nonprevailing
party" (singular). Again, where a contract contains a fees provision that awards fees to a
"prevailing party," there can be only one prevailing party. Mountain States Broadcasting

Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555-56 (Utah App. 1989). 5
Appellees argue that the fee provision in Mountain States was "nothing like" the fee
provision in this case. (Appellees' Br. at p. 46). The fees provision in Mountain States
provided for a "prevailing party" rather than a "non-prevailing party." This is a distinction
without a difference. After noting that both parties sought damages, the Mountain States
court concluded:
"Our review of the relevant case law convinces us that under the provision at issue,
there can be only one prevailing party even though both plaintiff and defendant are
awarded money damages on claims arising from the same transaction." Id. at 556
(emphasis added)

vb

If there can be only one prevailing party, then it logically follows that there can be
only one non-prevailing party. 6

Appellees rely on LDS Hosp. v. Capitol Lffe Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857 (Utah 1988). In that
case, the Court narrowed its focus only to exclusionary clauses in insurance contracts.
Exclusionary insurance clauses have no applicability in this case.
5

Appellees offer no meaningful response to Beckman' s citations to the net judgment rule
and the comparative victory rule. (See Beckman's Br. at p. 33).

6

7
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In sum, under the plain language of section 16 of the Employment Agreement, there
can be only one "nonprevailing party" and Cybertary was quite clearly that party. The

~

District Court's inventive "bifurcation" approach must be reversed.
Beckman also notes that Cybertary's request for fees on appeal should be denied.
Because Cybertary has not filed a cross-appeal, there is no possible scenario under which
Beckman would be the "nonprevailing party" (as defined in the Employment Agreement).
This is true even if Beckman does not prevail on a single issue presented in this appeal.
Unless and until Cybertary is awarded more than $138,458.95 (the difference between what
Cybertary sought as damages and what Beckman sought), then Cybertary remains the
"nonprevailing party" as defined in the Employment Agreement.

III.

The District Court incorrectly awarded attorney's fees to Franchise Foundry
and Faulconer.
A.

The plain language of the Amended Complaint shows that Beckman 's
breach of contract claim was asserted against Cybertary only.

Appellees seize on paragraph 27 in Beckman's Amended Complaint (Appellees'
Br. at p. 39) but fail to present any meaningful response to Beckman's identification of the
plain language in that paragraph showing that the allegations were made against Faulconer
~

and Franchise Foundry for their actions ''on behalf of Cybertary." (R. 13). Appellees
likewise fail to address the allegations in paragraphs 24 and 26 which show that Beckman' s
allegation has consistently been that Cybertary breached the Employment Agreement. (R.

~

13).

Appellees' also seize on the language in the Amended Complaint's "prayer for
relief." (Appellees' Br. at p. 39). That "prayer" (R. 11) cannot be read in a vacuum. The

8
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~

ViJ

Amended Complaint contains no allegations that Faulconer or Franchise Foundry were
~

parties to the Employment Agreement or that their liability to Beckman arose out of
breaching the Employment Agreement. Instead, the Amended Complaint alleges that there

are only two parties to the Employment Agreement (Cybertary and Beckman) (see ,Il 1, R.
~

15), that Cybertary breached the agreement by failing to pay Beckman's wages (see ,I12,
16, and 24, R. 13-15), and that Faulconer and Franchise Foundry's retaliation was "on
behalf of Cybertary" (,I,I24-26, R.13 ).
In comparison, the allegations against Faulconer and Franchise Foundry are
different in form and substance: Faulconer's termination letter makes only vague
allegations and his attempted termination of Beckman was not in compliance with the
Operating Agreement (,I,I18, 20, R. 14); Franchise Foundry and Faulconer have interfered
with Beckman's ability to perform her duties as CEO (,I22, R. 13); and Beckman should
be granted declaratory relief against Franchise Foundry and Faulconer predicated on their
~

retaliation and lack of good faith. (,I,I34-35, R. 11-12).
Appellees may elect not to "quibble" with Beckman's logic (See Appellees' Br. at
p. 40), but Appellees may not rewrite the plain language of the Amended Complaint.
Further, Appellees fail to identify any documents in the record that show Beckman
prosecuted her breach of contract claim in a manner that even implied Franchise Foundry
and Faulconer were parties to the Employment Agreement. To the contrary: Beckman's
counsel repeatedly emphasized in the proceedings before the District Court that the breach
of contract claim was never asserted against Franchise Foundry or Faulconer. (R. 683, 1851
at p. 35). This is further supported by the consensus in the District Court that Beckman
9
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sought to hold Franchise Foundry and Faulconer liable under Utah Code Ann.§ 48-2c-807.
(R. 1370-71, 1381, 1401-02, 1472-74). Simply stated, Beckman's claim against Franchise

~·

Foundry and Faulconer was predicated on statutory liability and not contractual.

B.

Bilanzich and Hooban are not applicable.

Appellees tum to Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, 160 P.3d 1041 and Hooban v.

Unicity Intern., Inc., 2009 UT App 287, 220 P.3d 485. The first condition set forth in
Bilzanich (that the action is ''based upon" a written contract) is not applicable. Beckman's
claim against Franchise Foundry was not "based upon" the Employment Agreement; her
declaratory judgment claim (predicated on statutory liability) against both Franchise
Foundry and Faulconer survived summary judgment and was presented at trial. (See R.
1494,jury instructions 19-21)
Turning to Hooban, the core of the Supreme Court's reasoning was based on the
fact that the plaintiff brought his lawsuit as if he were a party to the contract and sought
fees under that contract. Hooban, supra, at ,Il0. That scenario is not analogous or even
helpful to understanding Ms. Beckman's claim against Franchise Foundry and Faulconer.
Not once did Ms. Beckman ask for a fees award against Franchise Foundry or Faulconer.
Not once did Ms. Beckman ever assert that Franchise Foundry or Faulconer were parties
to the Employment Agreement. Unlike the plaintiff in Hooban, Ms. Beckman's claim
against Franchise Foundry and Faulconer was predicated on statutory liability. Thus,

Hooban provides no help to the Appellees.
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~·

C.

The District Court's fees award to Franchise Foundry and Faulconer
was based on an unequal exposure of risk.

Appellees correctly note that Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 is intended to create a
level playing field and to prevent an unequal exposure of risk. (Appellees' Br. at p. 42).
~

However, Appellees incorrectly claim that "Beckman could have recovered fees, but
Franchise Foundry and Faulconer could not.'~ (Id. at p. 43). The opposite is true. Beckman
most certainly could not have recovered her fees (against Franchise Foundry and
Faulconer) had the jury concluded that those two Defendants engaged in willful
misconduct or gross negligence in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-807. There is no

VP

basis for fees under Utah Code Ann.§ 48-2c-807. Accordingly, the District Court subjected
Beckman to an unequal exposure of risk which resulted in a financial windfall to Franchise

vib

Foundry and Faulconer. This is precisely the type of disproportionate risk that courts are
obligated to avoid in the context of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826. See Bilanzich, supra, at
iJ20.

D.

Franchise Foundry and Faulconer should not be awarded any fees
incurred on appeal.

For the same reasons that Franchise Foundry and Faulconer should not have been
awarded fees by the District Court, they should not be awarded fees on appeal.

IV.

Beckman's wages were quantified, fixed, and complete, and she should have
been awarded prejudgment interest.
A.

Consolidation Coal and Wilcox are meaningless to the facts of this case.

Appellees cite Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 886
P .2d 514 (Utah 1994) for the proposition that the Supreme Court has "serious reservations"

11

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

whether Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 applies in any context other than "a loan or forbearance
of any money, goods, or chose in action." (Appellees' Br. at p. 46). Consolidation Coal is

\l'L.,-

an odd case for the Appellees to rely on. In that case, the Supreme Court-despite any
"reservations" expressed in a dicta footnote-awarded prejudgment interest, concluding
that the unpaid royalties (the damages) could be "easily and accurately be determined."
Consolidation Coal, 886 P .2d at 524. 7

Next, Appellees refer to Wilcox v. Anchor Wate, Co., 2007 UT 39, 164 P.3d 353 for
the proposition that prejudgment interest does not apply in all contract cases. (Appellees'
Br. at p. 46, citing Wilcox at 145). Paragraph 45 of Wilcox is also dicta and had nothing to
do with the holding in the case. 8 In Wilcox, the Utah Supreme Court concluded the
appropriate prejudgment interest rate under the Utah Insurers Rehabilitation and
Liquidation Act was the rate applicable under federal bankruptcy law. Id. at 1146-4 7. In
other words, Wilcox has absolutely nothing do to with prejudgment interest in the context
of unpaid wages. Moreover, Beckman does not take (and has never taken) the position that
prejudgment interest should be applied in all contract cases. Beckman's view is that
prejudgment interest is appropriate for her unpaid wages because they were quantified,
fixed, complete, and ascertainable by facts and figures.

In Consolidation Coal, the Supreme Court rejected the same argument that Appellees
present in their brief: that the trier of fact must "subjectively estimate when the damages
are complete and the amount of those damages." Id. at 524.
7

Paragraph 45 of Wilcox (the paragraph Appellees cite) references the aforementioned
footnote in Consolidation Coal and expressly refers to it as "dicta".

8
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~

B.

Beckman 's damages were fixed, complete, and ascertainable by facts
and figures.

Appellees argue that 'jury discretion" precludes an award of prejudgment interest
and they first rely on Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379 (Utah 1995). (See Appellees' Br. at
pp. 46-47). Cornia involved an award of damages based on "loss of and damage" to about
500 heads of cattle. The plaintiffs request for prejudgment interest was denied because the
jury heard conflicting testimony from experts on various characteristics of the cattle
(weight, gender, mortality rates, etc.), and therefore, the jury was required to use its
discretion to ascertain the value of the cattle. Cornia, 898 P.2d at 1387.
Unlike the jury in Cornia, the jury in this case did not need to exercise its discretion
m choosing between competing expert valuations. Again, sections 3 and 4 of the
vJJ

Employment Agreement established Cybertary's contractual obligation to pay salary and
benefits in defined amounts and at specified times. (See Beckman's Statement of Fact No.
15). It did not and does not take an expert to review what should have been paid and what
actually was paid. Any "discretion" the jury exercised to arrive at $103,063.83 in unpaid
salary and benefits was based on readily ascertainable facts and figures spelled out in
section 3 of the Employment Agreement.
The next case the Appellees rely on, Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer,

LLC, 2009 UT 7, 210 P.3d 263, is quite harmful to the Appellees and quite helpful for
Beckman. In Encon, the Utah Supreme Court affinned the award of prejudgment interest.
The Encon court rejected the defendants' view that while damages continue to accrue, all
vi

of the damages figures must be known and "remain static" throughout the litigation. Id. at
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,s2.

Instead, the ''the standard focuses on the measurability and calculability of the

damages." Id. In Encon, the court drew a distinction between damages based on a "mere

~

description of the wrongs done or injuries inflicted" (and prejudgment interest is not
appropriate)9 versus those damages where the "amount due under [a] contract was
ascertainable by calculation and it was only the method to be used in making the calculation
that was uncertain" (and prejudgment interest is appropriate). Id. at ,,53-54. "Where
damage figures are subject to calculation ... even if the method of calculating is uncertain,
or the damage figures change, prejudgment interest i~ appropriate." Id.at ,ss.
Returning to the present case, for reasons that have previously been described (ad

~

nauseam), Beckman's damages were subject to calculation based on amounts due under

section 3 of the Employment Agreement.
Appellees next argue that the jury "had to determine the amount of offset (if any)
that should be counted against Beckman for her unauthorized use of Cybertary's funds."
Beckman rejects the allegation that she engaged in any "unauthorized use of Cybertary's
funds" and Appellees fail to identify which portions of trial exhibit 28 show that she did. 10
And even if Appellees had properly briefed this argument, Appellees fail to cite any
~

authority that ''offsets" automatically render prejudgment interest to be incalculable.

The examples of these type of damages would be personal injury, wrongful death,
defamation of character, and false imprisonment. Id. at 53.

9

Without a proper citation to the record, the Appellees' disparaging allegation that
Beckman engaged in "unauthorized use of Cybertary funds'' has not been adequately
briefed and this Court should not even consider that allegation. See Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9).
10
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C.

The Appellees' attempt to distinguish Kraatz is unpersuasive.

Appellees claim that Cybertary's "defenses" and claims of offset render Kraatz v.
Heritage Imports, 2003 UT App 201, 71 P.3d 188 to be "distinguishable." (Appellees' Br.

at p. 49). Upon reading that argument, Beckman wonders if Appellees bothered to read
Kraatz. Even a cursory reading of Kraatz reveals that the employer most certainly

presented defenses and disputed the amount of the aggrieved employee's damages. The
disputes included: the value of the employee's unpaid stock appreciation (Id. at ,r,r7-14);
the amount of the employee's bonuses (Id. at ,r,r15-22); the value of the employee's club
memberships (Id. at ,I,I33-37); the amount of the employee's relocation expenses (Id. at

,I,I38-43); and the value of several consequential losses (Id. at ,I,I48-55). The
aforementioned disputes did not render the employee's damages to be incalculable or
viP

unsupported by facts and figures, and the employee was ultimately awarded prejudgment
interest on his unpaid salary and employment benefits. In other words, Kraatz is both useful
Vig

and instructive in evaluating whether Beckman was entitled to prejudgment interest.
Plainly, she was.

D.

Interest does not accrue from each and every date Beckman 's wages
became due.

Appellees' final argument on prejudgment interest is that Beckman's damages were
vi)

"not calculable with mathematical certainty" because "interest would have to accrue from
each payment from the date it was missed." (Appellees' Br. at p. 50).1 1 This is the same

~

11

Appellees rely on Smith v. Fabfax Reality, Inc., 2003 UT 41, 82 P.3d 1064 for the
proposition that interest is calculated from the date of the breach. Appellees cite ,rs of
Smith, which most certainly does not state that interest is calculated from the date of the
15
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argument that the Court rejected in Encom. Beckman's damages did not have to remain
static throughout the litigation. Encom at 152. Instead, the "the standard focuses on the
measurability and calculability of the damages." Id. The Appellees' disagreement over how
prejudgment interest is calculated does not mean prejudgment interest is not appropriate.

See Id. at 155. Because Beckman's unpaid salary and benefits were subject to mathematical
calculation (under the amounts set forth in section 3 of the Employment Agreement), she
should have been awarded prejudgment interest.
Additionally, before Beckman's termination, there was no prejudgment interest
"clock" that was "ticking" (as Appellees phrase it). The Appellees nonsensical "ticking"
argument runs counter to the basic premise that prejudgment interest does not accrue unless
and until the damages become "complete." Kraatz, supra, at 154 (internal citations
omitted). Ms. Beckman's damages were not fixed or "complete" until Mr. Faulconer sent
the termination letter on November 14, 2011. (See Pia. Trial Ex. 19).
In sum, Beckman's damages were fixed as to time (complete as of November 14,
2011) and supported by facts and figures (see section 3 of the Employment Agreement).
The District Court's refusal to award prejudgment interest was incorrect and should be
reversed.

breach. Smith actually runs counter to the Appellees' position. In Smith, the Court affirmed
the award of prejudgment interest despite the competing expert valuations regarding real
property. Id. at 123.
16
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V.

The Recording was not 90 minutes of "compromise negotiations" and the
District Court erred in excluding it.
A.

This Court may review the District Court's exclusion of the Recording.

For reasons unknown to Beckman, the District Court clerk omitted the CDR
xi>

containing an MP3 recording of the October 19, 2011 phone call (the "Recording") from
the official record. On December 9, 2015, Beckman filed her motion to supplement the
record (along with a CDR containing a copy of the recording), and for the reasons set forth
in her motion, the record should be supplemented to include a copy of the recording.

B.

The Recording is not 90 minutes of "compromise negotiations."

Appellees argue that "[a]bout twenty minutes into the Recording," Beckman
"agreed" that the call was for settlement purposes only. (Appellees' Br. at p. 26). This is a
v,

flagrant misstatement. As noted in Beckman' s opening brief, Beckman' s statement ''about
twenty minutes into the Recording" was as follows: "Now you said this discussion is for
settlement purposes only." (Recording at 20:50-21 :20) (emphasis added). As the above
excerpt shows, Beckman most certain! y did not agree that the entire 90 minute-call was
for "settlement purposes only."
Appellees tum to Eisenberg v. Univ. ofN.M., 936 F.2d 1131, 1134 (10th Cir. 1991 ),
a case that actually supports Beckman' s argument. In Eisenberg, the court considered
whether an affidavit, "submitted to the court in support of a request for a settlement
conference, should be excluded from Rule 11 consideration pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 408."
Eisenberg, 936 F.2d at 1134. The Eisenberg court allowed the affidavit to be admitted into
evidence, and noted that while the underlying purpose of Rule 408 is to promote non-
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judicial settlement of disputes, "evidence of unqualified factual assertions is admissible.''
Id.

C.

Faulconer did not raise any dispute before or during the phone call.

Utah R. Evid. 408(a) excludes communications to prove liability for a "disputed
claim". Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah 1998). In an attempt to identify a
"dispute," Appellees point to correspondence from Beckman sent eight days before the call
occurred. (Appellees' Br. at p. 27-28). Beckman's correspondence, by itself, does not
create a "dispute" subject to Rule 408; it takes two parties to have a dispute. Beckman also
reiterates that the October 19, 2011 phone call occurred 26 days before her employment
was tenninated (on November 14, 2011).
The Appellees also refer to Faulconer's email sent the day before the phone call
occurred where he claimed the call would be for "settlement purposes only." (Appellees'
Br. at pp. 27-28). Faulconer's statement does not create a "dispute" for purposes of Rule
408, and his unilateral characterization of the call is not enough to place the entire 90minute Recording in the safe harbor of Rule 408. Appellees next refer to an email Beckman
sent the day after the call occurred. (R. 1208), but Appellees fail to explain how Beckman' s
offer of partial forbearance of litigation (sent after the call occurred) somehow makes the
entire 90-minute Recording ''compromise negotiations."
Appellees point out that Faulconer stated (during the call) that Cybertary had
"grounds" to terminate Beckman. However, Faulconer failed to explain what those
"grounds" were. In fact. Faulconer stated that he was not "looking for grounds" (Recording
at 10:45-11 :00), Cybertary was not taking any action to terminate Beckman (Id. at 11 :00),
18
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and any discussion of majority vote for tennination was a ··moot point" because Cybertary
was not looking to terminate her employment. (Id. at 11 :35). 12 These are not the comments
of someone voicing any dispute as to whether Beckman was owed her wages.
The simple fact of the matter is that during the call, over and over again, Faulconer
admitted that Beckman was owed her wages and that Cybertary had no intent of
tenninating her employment. (See Beckman' s statement of fact no. 40). This is not
evidence of a "'disputed claim" that would fall under the safety net of Rule 408.

D.

The parties did not exchange settlement offers.

Appellees argue "'nothing in Rule 408 suggests that a settlement offer must offer to
resolve all pending claims and defenses for their full amount." (Appellees' Br. at p. 30).
This is a red herring. The issue is not whether Faulconer' s statements were offers to settle
"all pending claims"; under the plain language of Utah R. Evid. 408(a), the issue was
whether Faulconer made an offer of "valuable consideration" to settle a "disputed claim."
viP

His offer of a "'good faith token" payment of $2,000 (Recording at 1:28:45) was not, in any
context, an offer to settle Beckman's entire claim for what was in excess of $200,000.
Nothing in the call remotely suggests that Faulconer or Beckman construed the offer of
$2,000 as full and final settlement of all of Beckman's outstanding wages. 13

Yet another misstatement Appellees make is that Beckman stated (during the call) that
she alone ·•directed how Cybertary funds were spent." This is nonsense. In fact, Faulconer
stated if and how Beckman gets paid is subject to his approval. (Recording at 44:50)

· 12

Vil

Faulconer characterized $2,000 as an -~interim'· payment. {Id. at 1:23:50). An ••interim"
payment is not an offer to "settle" all outstanding payments.
13
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Moreover, Faulconer's "good faith token" payment of $2,000 was not "coupled" (as
Appellees put it) with Beckman's demand that Franchise Foundry discontinue its
involvement with Cybertary. Beckman's demand occurred at the 16:50 mark of the call.
Faulconer's reference to a "good faith token" occurred over an hour later at the I :28:45
mark of the call. The two comments had no connection to each other and were not
"coupled'' into a single offer to settle a disputed claim.

E.

The recorded call contains admissible business communications.

Appellees attempt to distinguish Cassino v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 8 I 7 F.2d
1338 (9th Cir. 1987) by claiming it should be limited to federal discrimination cases where
the "settlement agreement itself is part of the employer's discriminatory conduct, and
therefore, has independent legal significance." (Appellees' Br. at p. 31). Nowhere in
Cassino did the Ninth Circuit place such a limitation. Instead, the Ninth Circuit

distinguished between two types of settlement agreements: The first is where the
negotiation and settlement arise after the employee's termination and after the employee
has claimed to be the victim of discrimination. Id. at 1342. This first type of settlement
correspondence is generally inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 408. The second type of
settlement negotiation occurs where the severance package (in exchange for a release of
potential claims) is offered contemporaneously with the notice of termination. Id. This

second type of settlement negotiation is generally admissible because the termination
agreement itself is "probative on the issue of discrimination." Id.
The second type of negotiation set forth in Cassino is analogous to the recorded
phone call in this case. The termination decision had not yet been made (the call occurred
20
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(s.,

26 days before termination). Beckman had not yet filed her lawsuit (the call occurred 14
~

days before the complaint was filed). And Faulconer's statements during the call are
probative on the issues of his willful misconduct and Cybertary's lack of "cause" for
Beckman' s termination.
Contrary to what Appellees would have this Court believe, not all of Beckman' s
"grievances" predate the recorded call. (See Appellees' Br. at p. 32). At the time the call
occurred, Beckman did not know that Faulconer would initiate the termination decision
(based on false accusations that have never been proven) and then claim that none of her
outstanding wages would be paid.
In totality, the Recording was positively not 90 minutes of "compromise
negotiations," and not once did Faulconer make an offer to settle a disputed claim. The
District Court incorrectly excluded the Recording, that prejudicial ruling should be
reversed, and this case should be remanded for a new trial.

~

VI.

The District Court's denial of leave to file a second amended complaint was a
per se abuse of discretion.
Beckman's counsel is compelled to note that Appellees correctly claim that he

l;;iJ

indeed made two errors in his opening brief regarding dates. First, Beckman' s counsel
openly concedes that on page 51 of the opening brief, he mistakenly referred to the current
version of Rule 26( c) rather than the pre-April 2013 version of that rule. And second, on
page 52 of the opening brief, Beckman' s counsel inadvertently listed May 20, 2012 rather
than May 20, 2011 as the date of Ms. Beckman' s bankruptcy filing. May 20, 2011 is the
correct date, as reflected in Beckman's Statement of Fact No. 32 and Plaintiffs Trial
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Exhibit 50. Those two errors do not alter the conclusions that Beckman's motion was
timely, her bankruptcy handcuffed her from prosecuting her case promptly, and that
Appellees would not have suffered any prejudice from the proposed amendment. The
District Court's denial of leave should be reversed.
A.

Beckman's motion for leave was timely.

Appellees argue that Beckman's motion for leave was filed after the completion of
fact discovery and in the "advanced procedural stages of litigation." (Appellees' Br. at p.
20). Those statements are demonstrably false. Beckman's motion for leave was filed on
March 15, 2013 (R. 166)-54 days prior to the expiration of fact discovery on May 8,
2013. 14
Appellees rely heavily on Kelly v. Hard Money Funding, Inc., 2004 UT App 44, 87
P.3d 734, a case that supports Beckman's view. In Kelly, this Court reversed the District
Court's denial of the plaintiffs motion for leave. Id. at ,r,r42-53. This Court noted that Mr.
Kelly's motion was filed before any trial date had been set. Id. at ,r49. This Court further
noted that there was no evidence of a dilatory motive, and simply because additional
discovery would be needed is an insufficient basis for denying a motion for leave. Id. at

,r,rs0-51.

Perhaps most importantly, This Court concluded that the trial court failed to

sufficiently articulate the basis for its denial of leave:
"We nevertheless reiterate the well-accepted rule that it is a per se abuse of
discretion for a trial court to fail to explain its decision regarding a motion to amend
Under the 2012 version of Rule 26(c), fact discovery is calculated as follows: Beckman's
initial disclosures were served on September 19, 2012 (R. 278); Cybertary' s initial
disclosures were due 28 days later (on October 12, 2012); 210 days (under tier 3 discovery)
from October 12, 2012 is May 8, 2013.
14
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4s.-

with reference to the appropriate principles of law or the factual circumstances that
necessitate a particular result." Id. at 142 (emphasis added)
Like the trial court in Kelly, the District Court in this case failed to refer to the
appropriate principles of law or the factual findings justifying its order. The District Court
i..j

reached two conclusions without any explanation: that Beckman's motion was untimely
and Appellees would suffer prejudice. (R. 351-352). The District Court omitted any
explanation of how or why the motion was untimely, omitted any description of the alleged
"prejudice," and omitted any reference to the justification for the delay in filing the motion.
This was a per se abuse of discretion under the guidance of Kelly.
Appellees repeatedly emphasize that Beckman did not file a motion seeking
extraordinary discovery. This argument ignores the practical reality that filing a motion for

Vfv

extraordinary discovery on Beckman's additional claims (in the proposed second amended
complaint) made no sense unless and until Beckman was pennitted to actually bring those
claims (i.e. until her motion for leave was granted).

B.

There is no evidence in the record that Beckman acted in bad faith or
with a dilatory motive.

Appellees emphasize that Beckman' s bankruptcy was filed May 20, 2011, more
Vi1

than five months before she filed her lawsuit. (Appellees' Br. at p. 21 ). Regardless of when
the bankruptcy was filed, Beckman could not proceed with prosecuting this case until she
was notified that her interest in the case would not be seized by the trustee. As late as April
2013, the bankruptcy trustee still did not know whether Beckman' s interest in this litigation
l/9

would be seized. (R. 326-327). Importantly, Beckman's bankruptcy is not evidence of bad
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faith or a dilatory motive. See Kelly at ,r,r32-38 (the 'justification prong" is evaluated on
whether the delay was based on bad faith or a dilatory motive).
Again, Beckman is compelled to point to the elephant in the room: her bankruptcy
was the result of working month after month without getting paid her wages. Accordingly,
there is zero evidence in the record showing any bad faith or dilatory motive on Beckman's
part. Any "bad faith" was shown by the Appellees' duplicitous scheme to withhold
Beckman's wages, divert Cybertary's revenue to Franchise Foundry's coffers (see Pia.
Trial Ex. 34, 15 showing $265,751 in payments to Franchise Foundry), thereby driving
Beckman into Bankruptcy and then terminating her employment for no reason.
Appellees then engage in mudslinging that Beckman fraudulently concealed assets
from the bankruptcy trustee and that she should not be rewarded for her fraud by being
granted leave to amend. (Appellees' Br. at p. 22). Beckman concealed nothing. Her claims
in the litigation constitute a "legal interest" that could have potentially been seized by the
trustee-under 11 U.S.C. § 541-regardless of whether those claims were merely breach

~

of contract and declaratory relief (as set forth in the Amended Complaint, R. 17), or
whether her claims also included breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, fraud and
~

conspiracy (the additional claims set forth in the proposed second amended complaint, R.
190). The issue is not what "claims" were or were not asserted; the issue (under 11 U.S.C.

§ 541) was Beckman' s "legal interest" in the lawsuit, which Beckman unquestionably
disclosed to the trustee, and which Beckman feared she may lose.

15

Summarizing Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 28
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C.

Additional discovery is not "unavoidable prejudice".

Appellees claim they would have suffered prejudice because they would have been
deprived of time to conduct discovery on the additional claims set forth in the Amended
Complaint. (Appellees' Br. at pp. 23-24). Again, simply because additional discovery is
needed does not inflict "prejudice" sufficient to deny a motion for leave. See Kelly, supra,
at ,I31. Moreover, the trial in this action did not take place until October 2014, some 19
months after Beckman's motion for leave was filed, and that left ample time to conduct
additional discovery. Again, the "prejudice" Appellees identify is nothing more than simple
~

prejudice (as opposed to unavoidable prejudice), and simple prejudice does not warrant
denial of leave. See Kelly, supra, at ,I3 l
In sum, Beckman was deprived of her opportunity to have her claims decided on the
merits rather than procedural niceties. See Minter v. Prime Equip. Co., 451 F.3d 1196, 1204
(10th Cir. 2006) (The purpose of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 is to provide litigants with the
"maximum opportunity for each claim to be decided on the merits rather than on procedural
niceties.") The District Court's denial of leave was a per se abuse of discretion that must
be reversed.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

Beckman requests an award of attorney's fees incurred in this appeal pursuant to
section 16 of the Employment Agreement (Pia. Trial Ex. 1). Beckman's attorney's fees
should be awarded against Cybertary only. Beckman seeks an award of her costs in this
appeal pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 34.

25

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Beckman requests oral argument for this appeal pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 29.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Beckman respectfully requests that the District Court be
reversed on all issues presented for review, that the final judgments in this action be
vacated, and that this case be remanded for a new trial.

Respectfully Submitted on this the 14th day of December, 2015.

STAVROS LAW, P.C.

Aus~
Attorney for Appellant Patricia Beckman

<vw
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